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Abstract
This paper discusses a special type of multi-user communication scenario, in which users’ utilities
are linearly impacted by their competitors’ actions. First, we explicitly characterize the Nash equilibrium
and Pareto boundary of the achievable utility region. Second, the price of anarchy incurred by the
non-collaborative Nash strategy is quantified. Third, to improve the performance in the non-cooperative
scenarios, we investigate the properties of an alternative solution concept named conjectural equilibrium,
in which individual users compensate for their lack of information by forming internal beliefs about
their competitors. The global convergence of the best response and Jacobi update dynamics that achieve
various conjectural equilibria are analyzed. It is shown that the Pareto boundaries of the investigated
linearly coupled games can be sustained as stable conjectural equilibria if the belief functions are properly
initialized. The investigated models apply to a variety of realistic applications encountered in the multiple
access design, including wireless random access and flow control.
Index Terms
Nash equilibrium, Pareto-optimality, conjectural equilibrium, non-cooperative games.
I. INTRODUCTION
Game theory provides a formal framework for studying the interactions of strategic agents. Recently,
there has been a surge in research activities that employ game theory to model and analyze a wide range
of application scenarios in modern communication networks [1]- [4]. In communication networks, any
action taken by a single user usually affects the utilities of the other users sharing the same resources.
Depending on the characteristics of different applications, numerous game-theoretical models and solution
concepts have been proposed to describe the multi-user interactions and optimize the users’ decisions in
communication networks. Roughly speaking, the existing multi-user research can be categorized into two
types, non-cooperative games and cooperative games. Various game theoretic solutions were developed
2to characterize the resulting performance of the multi-user interaction, including the Nash Equilibrium
(NE) and the Pareto-optimality [18].
Non-cooperative approaches generally assume that the participating users simply choose actions to
selfishly maximize their individual utility functions. It is well-known that if devices operate in a non-
cooperative manner, this will generally limit their performance as well as that of the whole system, because
the available resources are not always efficiently exploited due to the conflicts of interest occurring among
users [5]. Most non-cooperative approaches are devoted to investigating the existence and properties of
the NE. In particular, several non-cooperative game models, such as S-modular games, congestion games,
and potential games, have been extensively applied in various communication scenarios [6]- [9]. The price
of anarchy, a measure of how good the system performance is when users play selfishly and reach the
NE instead of playing to achieve the social optimum, has also been addressed in several communication
network applications [10] [11].
On the other hand, cooperative approaches in communication theory usually focus on studying how
users can jointly improve their performance when they cooperate. For example, the users may optimize a
common objective function, which represents the Pareto-optimal social welfare allocation rule based on
which the system-wide resource allocation is performed [12] [13]. A profile of actions is Pareto-optimal
if there is no other profile of actions that makes every player at least as well off and at least one player
strictly better off. Allocation rules, e.g. network utility maximization, can provide reasonable allocation
outcomes by considering the trade-off between fairness and efficiency. Most cooperative approaches focus
on studying how to efficiently find the optimum joint policy. It is worth mentioning that information
exchanges among users is generally required to enable users to coordinate in order to achieve and sustain
Pareto-efficient outcomes.
In this paper, we present a game model for a particular type of non-cooperative multi-user communi-
cation scenario. We name it linearly coupled communication games, because users’ utilities are linearly
impacted by their competitors’ actions. In particular, the main contributions of this paper are as follows.
First, based on the assumptions that we make about the properties of users’ utility, we characterize
the inherent structures of the utility functions for the linearly coupled games. Furthermore, based on
the derived utility forms, we explicitly quantify the NE and Pareto boundary for the linearly coupled
communication games. The price of anarchy incurred by the selfish users playing the Nash strategy is
quantified. In addition, to improve the performance in the non-cooperative scenarios, we investigate an
alternative solution: conjectural equilibrium (CE). Using this approach, individual users are modeled as
belief-forming agents that develop internal beliefs about their competitors and behave optimally with
3respect to their individual beliefs. Necessary and sufficient conditions that guarantee the convergence of
different dynamic update mechanisms, including the best response and Jacobi update, are addressed. We
prove that these adjustment processes based on conjectures and non-cooperative individual optimization
can be globally driven to Pareto-optimality in the linearly coupled games without the need of real-time
coordination information exchange among agents.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II defines the linearly coupled communication
games. For the investigated game models, Section III explicitly computes the NE and Pareto boundary
of the achievable utility region and quantifies the price of anarchy. Section IV introduces the CE and
investigates its properties under both the best response and Jacobi update dynamics. Conclusions are
drawn in Section V.
II. GAME MODEL
In this section, we first provide a general game-theoretic formulation of the multi-user interaction in
communication systems. Following the proposed definition, we define the linearly coupled communication
games and provide concrete examples of the investigated game model.
A. Linearly Coupled Communication Games
The multi-user game in various communication scenarios can be formally defined as a tuple Γ =
〈N ,A, u,S, s〉. In particular, N = {1, 2, . . . , N} is the set of communication devices, which are the
rational decision-makers in the system. Define A to be the joint action space A = ×n∈NAn, with An
being the action set available for user n. As opposed to the traditional strategic game definition [18],
we introduce two new elements S and s into the game formulation. Specifically, S is the state space
S = ×n∈NSn, where Sn ⊆ R+ is the part of the state relevant to user n. The state is defined to
capture the effects of the multi-user coupling such that each user’s utility solely depends on its own state
and action. In other words, the utility function u = ×n∈Nun is a mapping from the individual users’
state space and action space to real numbers, un : Sn × An → R. The state determination function
s = ×n∈N sn maps joint actions to states for each component sn : A→ Sn. To capture the performance
tradeoff, the utility region is defined as U = {(u1(a), . . . , uN (a))| ∃ a = (a1, a2, . . . , aN ) ∈ A}.
Definition 1: A multi-user interaction is considered a linearly coupled communication game if the
action set An ⊆ R+ is convex and the utility function un satisfies:
un(a) = a
βn
n · sn(a), (1)
4in which βn > 0. In particular, the basic assumptions about sn(a) include:
A1: sn(a) is non-negative;
A2: Denote s′nm(a) =
∂sn(a)
∂am
and s′′nm(a) =
∂2sn(a)
∂a2m
. sn(a) is strictly linear decreasing in am,∀m 6= n,
i.e. s′nm(a) < 0 and s′′nm(a) = 0; sn(a) is non-increasing and linear in an, i.e. s′nn(a) ≤ 0 and s′′nn(a) = 0.
A3: sn(a)s′nm(a) is an affine function, ∀n ∈ N \ {m}.
A4: s
′
nm(a)
sn(a)
=
s′km(a)
sk(a)
,∀n, k ∈ N \ {m}; s
′
mm(a)
sm(a)
= 0 or s
′
nm(a)
sn(a)
, ∀n 6= m.
Assumptions A1 and A2 indicate that increasing am for any m 6= n within the domain of sn(a) will
linearly decrease user n’s utility. Assumptions A3 and A4 imply that a user’s action has proportionally
the same impact over the other users’ utility. The structure of the utility functions that satisfy assumptions
A1-A4 will be addressed in Section III.
B. Illustrative Examples
There are a number of multi-user communication scenarios that can be modeled as linearly coupled
communication games. For example, in the random access scenario [15], the action of a node is to
select its transmission probability and a node n will independently attempt transmission of a packet with
transmit probability pn. The action set available to node n is An = [0, 1] for all n ∈ N . In this case, the
utility function is defined as
un(p) = pn ·
∏
m6=n
(1− pm). (2)
As an additional example, in flow control [16], N Poisson streams of packets are serviced by a single
exponential server with departure rate µ and each class can adjust its throughput rn. The utility function
is defined as the weighted ratio of the throughput over the average experienced delay:
un(r) = r
βn
n · (µ −
N∑
m=1
rm), (3)
in which βn > 0 is interpreted as the weighting factor. Specifically, we can see that the state determination
functions are sn(p) =
∏
m∈N\{n}(1− pm) in (2) and sn(r) = µ−
∑N
m=1 rm in (3). It is straightforward
to verify that these functions satisfy assumptions A1-A4 for both (2) and (3).
In this paper, we are interested in comparing the achievable performance attained by different game-
theoretic solution concepts. On one hand, it is well-known that NE is generally inefficient in com-
munication games [17], but it may not require explicit message exchanges, while Pareto-optimality can
usually be achieved only by exchanging implicit or explicit coordination messages among the participating
users. On the other hand, in several recent works [14] [15], we have applied an alternative solution
5in different communication scenarios to improve the system performance in non-cooperative settings,
namely the conjectural equilibrium [21]. The following sections aim to compare the solutions of NE,
Pareto boundary, and CE in terms of the payoffs and informational requirements in the linearly coupled
multi-user interaction satisfying the assumptions A1-A4.
III. COMPUTATION OF THE NASH EQUILIBRIUM AND PARETO BOUNDARY FOR LINEARLY COUPLED
GAMES
In this section, we show that the computation of the NE and the Pareto boundary in linearly coupled
games is equivalent to solving linear equations. Specifically, we investigate the inherent structures of the
utility functions satisfying assumptions A1-A4 and define two basic types of linearly coupled games. The
performance loss incurred by the Nash strategy are quantified for Type II games.
A. Nash Equilibrium
In non-cooperative games, the participating users simply choose actions to selfishly maximize their
individual utility functions. The steady state outcome of such interactions is an operating point, at which
given the other users’ actions, no user can increase its utility alone by unilaterally changing its action.
This operating point is known as the Nash equilibrium, which is formally defined below [18].
Definition 2: A profile a of actions constitutes a Nash equilibrium of Γ if un(an,a−n) ≥ un(a′n,a−n)
for all a′n ∈ An and n ∈ N .
We are interested in computing the NE in the linear coupled games. From equation (1), we have
∂ log[un(a)]
∂am
=


βn/an + s
′
nn(a)/sn(a), if m = n;
s′nm(a)/sn(a), otherwise.
(4)
On one hand, if s′nn(a) = 0,∀n ∈ N , since user n’s utility function strictly increases in an, we have
trivial NE at which a∗n is the maximal element in An that lies in the domain of s(·), ∀n ∈ N .
On the other hand, if s′nn(a) 6= 0,∀n ∈ N , according to assumption A3, since the multi-user
interactions are linearly coupled, we have
sn(a) = f
m
n (a−m) + g
m
n (a−m)am, (5)
where fmn (a−m), gmn (a−m) are both polynomials and gnn(a−n) 6= 0. From this, it follows
s′nn(a)
sn(a)
=
[
fnn (a−n)
gnn(a−n)
+ an
]−1
. (6)
6At NE, we have
∂ log[un(a)]
∂an
= 0,∀n ∈ N . (7)
Under assumption A3 and A4, f
n
n (a−n)
gnn(a−n)
is a affine function, which enables us to explicitly characterize
the NE. Denote f
n
n (a−n)
gnn(a−n)
= hn(a−n). Equation (7) can be rewritten as
βn · hn(a−n) + (βn + 1) · an = 0,∀n ∈ N . (8)
Therefore, the solutions of Equations (8) are the NE of the linearly coupled games and computing the
NE is equivalent to solving N -dimension linear equations. The following theorem indicates the inherent
structure of the utility functions {un}Nn=1 when the requirements A1-A3 are satisfied.
Theorem 1: Under assumptions A1-A3, the irreducible factors of sn(a) over the integers are affine
functions and have no variables in common.
Proof : Denote the factorization of sn(a) as
sn(a) =
Mn∏
i=1
bin(a), (9)
in which Mn represents the number of the non-constant irreducible factors in sn(a). Define V(·) as the
mapping from a polynomial to the set of variables that appear in that polynomial. Based on assumption
A2, we immediately have
V(bin(a)) ∩V(b
j
n(a)) = ∅,∀i, j(j 6= i), n.
Without loss of generality, we assume that aj ∈ V(b1n(a)) and b1n(a) = f
j
b1n
(a−j) + g
j
b1n
(a−j)aj . Then
f jn(a−j), g
j
n(a−j) in (5) are given by
f jn(a−j) = f
j
b1n
(a−j) ·
Mn∏
i=2
bin(a), and gjn(a−j) = g
j
b1n
(a−j) ·
Mn∏
i=2
bin(a).
Therefore, f
m
n (a−m)
gmn (a−m)
=
fj
b1n
(a−j)
gj
b1n
(a−j)
. By assumption A3, we have that the degree of
fj
b1n
(a−j)
gj
b1n
(a−j)
is less than or
equal to 1. Since b1n(a) is irreducible, we can conclude that g
j
b1n
(a−j) is a constant and the degree of
f jb1n
(a−j) is less than or equal to 1. Note that the arguments above hold, ∀j, n. Therefore, the degree of
bin(a) is one, ∀n ∈ N , i = 1, . . . ,Mn, which concludes the proof. 
B. Pareto Boundary
Since log(·) is concave and log[un(a)] is a composition of affine functions [19], un(a) is log-concave
in a and the log-utility region logU is convex. Therefore, we can characterize the Pareto boundary of
7the utility region as a set of a optimizing the following weighted proportional fairness objective1:
max
a
N∑
n=1
ωn log[un(a)], (10)
for all possible sets of {ωn} satisfying ωn ≥ 0 and
∑N
n=1 ωn = 1. Denote the optimal solution of problem
(10) as aPB, which satisfies the following first-order condition:
∂
∑N
k=1 ωk log[uk(a)]
∂an
∣∣∣∣
a=aPB
= 0,∀n ∈ N , (11)
Under assumptions A1-A3, the LHS of equation (11) can be rewritten as
∂
∑N
k=1 ωk log[uk(a)]
∂am
= ωm
(
βm
am
+
s′mm(a)
sm(a)
)
+
∑
k 6=m
ωk
s′km(a)
sk(a)
. (12)
By Theorem 1 and assumption A4, we have
s′km(a)
sk(a)
=
1
ψm(a)
, ∀k ∈ N \ {m}, (13)
in which ψm(a) is a affine function. Therefore, equation (12) is equivalent to
∂
∑N
k=1 ωk log[uk(a)]
∂am
=


βmωm/am + (1− ωm)/ψm(a), if s
′
mm(a) = 0;
βmωm/am + 1/ψm(a), otherwise.
(14)
We can compute the Pareto boundary of the linearly coupled games by solving linear equations:
∂
∑N
k=1 ωk log[uk(a)]
∂am
= 0⇒


βmωmψm(a) + (1− ωm)am = 0, if s
′
mm(a) = 0;
βmωmψm(a) + am = 0, otherwise.
(15)
Theorem 1 reveals the structural properties of the utility functions {un}Nn=1 when assumption A1-A3
are satisfied. Based on Theorem 1, the following theorem further refines these properties of {un}Nn=1
when the additional assumption A4 is imposed.
Theorem 2: Under assumptions A1-A4, for any polynomial bin(a) in the factorization sn(a) =
∏Mn
i=1 b
i
n(a),
∀n ∈ N , if |V(bin(a))| ≥ 2 or V(bin(a)) = {an}, bin(a) is an irreducible factor of sm(a), ∀m ∈ N ; if
V(bin(a)) = {am},m 6= n, b
i
n(a) is an irreducible factor of sj(a), ∀j ∈ N/{m}.
Proof : By assumption A2, s′nm(a) < 0,∀m 6= n, we have |V(sn(a))| ≥ N − 1,∀n ∈ N . By
Theorem 1, the irreducible factors of sn(a) have no common variables and they are affine functions.
Suppose |V(bin(a))| ≥ 2 and {am, al} ∈ V(bin(a). By assumption A4, we know that
s′nm(a)
sn(a)
=
s′km(a)
sk(a)
=
b′inm(a)
bin(a)
,∀n, k ∈ N \ {m}. Therefore, it follows
sk(a) =
s′km(a)b
i
n(a)
b′inm(a)
. (16)
1Note that the utility region U is not necessarily convex. Therefore, its Pareto boundary may not be characterized by the
weighted sum of {un(a)}Nn=1.
8Since b′inm(a) is a constant, we can see that bin(a) is an irreducible factor of sk(a), ∀k ∈ N \ {m}.
By symmetry, we can conclude that bin(a) must also be an irreducible factor of sk(a), ∀k ∈ N \ {l}.
Therefore, bin(a) is an irreducible factor of sk(a), ∀k ∈ N . Similarly, we can prove the remaining parts
of Theorem 2. 
Remark 1: For the linearly coupled games satisfying assumptions A1-A4, suppose we factorize all
users’ state functions. Theorem 2 indicates that any factor with at least two variables must be a common
factor of all the users’ state functions, and any factor with a single variable ak must be a common factor
of state functions for users excluding k. In reality, it corresponds to the communication scenarios in
which the state, i.e. the multi-user coupling, is impacted by a set of users that result in a similar signal
to all the users.
We define two basic types of linearly coupled games satisfying the assumptions A1-A4. In Type I
games, user k’s action linearly decreases all the users’ states but itself. Hence, the utility functions take
the form
un(a) = a
βn
n ·
∏
m6=n
(µm − τmam). (17)
In Type II games, all the users share the same non-factorizable state function and their utility functions
are given by
un(a) = a
βn
n · (µ−
N∑
m=1
τmam). (18)
As special examples, the random access problem in (2) belongs to Type I games and the rate control
problem in (3) belongs to Type II games. In fact, all the games that have the properties A1-A4 can be
viewed as compositions of these two basic types of games (See the example in Remark 1). Therefore,
investigating the two basic types provides us the fundamental understanding of the linearly coupled multi-
user interaction. A brief summary of the properties of Type I games will be provided in Section IV.E.
For the details about its various game-theoretic solutions, we refer the readers to [15] and the references
therein. The rest of this paper will focus on Type II games.
C. Nash Equilibrium and Pareto Boundary in Type II Games
For Type II games with utility functions given in (18), we have
s′nn(a)
sn(a)
=
−τn
µ−
∑N
m=1 τmam
. (19)
Therefore, Equation (8) can be reduced to
(1 + βn)τnan + βn
∑
m6=n
τmam = βnµ,∀n ∈ N . (20)
9The solution of the linear equations gives the NE, and its closed form has been addressed in [22] for
τn = 1,∀n ∈ N . For the general case, it is easy to verify that the NE is given by
aNEn =
βnµ
τn(1 +
∑N
m=1 βm)
,∀n ∈ N . (21)
Similarly, to compute the Pareto boundary of Type II games, Equation (14) can be reduced to
(1 + ωnβn)τnan + ωnβn
∑
m6=n
τmam = ωnβnµ,∀n ∈ N . (22)
The solution is given by
aPBn =
ωnβnµ
τn(1 +
∑N
m=1 ωmβm)
,∀n ∈ N . (23)
From Section II.B, we know that the region log U is convex. Therefore, we can compare the efficiency
of aNE and aPB using the system-utility metric
∑N
n=1 ωn log[un(a)]. Specifically, we have
N∑
n=1
ωn log
un(a
NE)
un(aPB)
=
N∑
n=1
ωnβn log
1 +
∑N
j=1 ωjβj
ωn(1 +
∑N
j=1 βj)
+ log
1 +
∑N
j=1 ωjβj
1 +
∑N
j=1 βj
. (24)
Denote w0 = 1, x0 =
1+
P
N
j=1
ωjβj
1+
P
N
j=1
βj
, wn = ωnβn, and xn =
1+
P
N
j=1
ωjβj
ωn(1+
P
N
j=1
βj)
,∀n ∈ N . Therefore,
N∑
n=1
ωn log
un(a
NE)
un(aPB)
=
N∑
n=1
wn log xn + w0 log x0 =
N∑
n=0
wn · log (
N∏
n=0
xwnn )
1/
P
N
n=0
wn . (25)
Using the inequalities among the arithmetic, geometric and harmonic means [24], we have
(1 +
∑N
n=1 ωnβn)
2
(1 +
∑N
n=1 ω
2
nβn)(1 +
∑N
n=1 βn)
=
∑N
n=0wn∑N
n=0
wn
xn
≤
( N∏
n=0
xwnn
) 1P
N
n=0
wn ≤
∑N
n=0 xnwn∑N
n=0 wn
= 1. (26)
Both inequalities hold with equality if and only if x0 = x1 = . . . = xN , i.e. ω1 = . . . = ωN = 1.
However, since we require
∑N
n=1 ωn = 1, (26) holds as strict inequalities, which leads to
(1 +
N∑
n=1
ωnβn) · log
(1 +
∑N
n=1 ωnβn)
2
(1 +
∑N
n=1 ω
2
nβn)(1 +
∑N
n=1 βn)
<
N∑
n=1
ωn log
un(a
NE)
un(aPB)
< 0. (27)
Based on Equation (27), we can make two important observations. First, due to the lack of coordination,
the NE in Type II games is always strictly Pareto inefficient. Second, as opposed to Type I games where
NE may result in zero utility for certain users [15], the efficiency loss in Type II games are lower bounded,
which means that every user receives positive payoff at NE. Noticing that the performance gap between
un(a
NE) and un(aPB) is non-zero, we will investigate how the non-cooperative CE solution can improve
the system performance for Type II games.
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IV. CONJECTURAL EQUILIBRIUM FOR THE LINEARLY COUPLED GAMES
A. Definitions
In game-theoretic analysis, conclusions about the reached equilibria are based on assumptions about
what knowledge the players possess. For example, the standard NE strategy assumes that every player
believes that the other players’ actions will not change at NE. Therefore, it chooses to myopically
maximize its immediate payoff [18]. Therefore, the players operating at equilibrium can be viewed as
decision makers behaving optimally with respect to their beliefs about the strategies of other players.
To avoid detrimental Nash strategy and encourage cooperation, the conjecture-based model has been
introduced by Wellman and others [20] [21] to enable non-cooperative players to build belief models
about how their competitors’ reactions vary in response to their own action changes. Specifically, each
player has some belief about the state that would result from performing its available actions. The belief
function s˜n is defined to be s˜n : An → Sn such that s˜n(an) represents the state that player n believes it
would result in if it selects action an . Notice that the beliefs are not expressed in terms of other players’
actions and preferences, and the multi-user coupling in these beliefs is captured indirectly by individual
players forming conjectures of the effects of their own actions. By deploying such a behavior model,
players will no longer adopt myopic behaviors that do not forecast s˜n, but rather they will form beliefs
s˜n(an) about how their actions an will influence the aggregate effects s˜n incurred by their competitors’
responses and, based on these beliefs, they will choose the action an ∈ An if it believes that this action
will maximize its utility. The steady state of such a play among belief-forming agents can be characterized
as a conjectural equilibria.
Definition 3: In the game Γ, a configuration of belief functions (s˜∗1, . . . , s˜∗N ) and a joint action a∗ =
(a∗1, . . . , a
∗
N ) constitute a conjectural equilibrium, if for each n ∈ N ,
s˜∗n(a
∗
n) = sn(a
∗
1, . . . , a
∗
N ) and a∗n = arg max
an∈An
un(s˜
∗
n(an), an).
From the above definition, we can see that, at CE, all players’ expectations based on their beliefs are
realized and each agent behaves optimally according to its expectation. In other words, agents’ beliefs
are consistent with the outcome of the play and they use “conjectured best responses” in their individual
optimization program. The key challenges are how to configure the belief functions such that cooperation
can be sustained in such a non-cooperative setting and how to design the evolution rules such that the
communication system can dynamically converge to a CE having satisfactory performance.
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B. Linear Beliefs
As discussed before, the belief functions need to be defined in order to investigate the existence of CE.
To define the belief functions, we need to express agent n’s expected state s˜n as a function of its own
action an. The simplest approach is to design linear belief models for each user, i.e. player n’s belief
function takes the form
s˜n(an) = s¯n − λn(an − a¯n), (28)
for n ∈ N . The values of s¯n and a¯n are specific states and actions, called reference points and λn is
a positive scalar. In other words, user n assumes that other players will observe its deviation from its
reference point a¯n and the aggregate state deviates from the reference point s¯n by a quantity proportional
to the deviation of an − a¯n. How to configure s¯n, a¯n, and λn will be addressed in the rest of this paper.
We focus on the linear belief represented in (28), because this simple belief form is sufficient to drive
the resulting non-cooperative equilibrium to the Pareto boundary.
The goal of user n is to maximize its expected utility aβnn · s˜n(an) taking into account the conjectures
that it has made about the other users. Therefore, the optimization a user needs to solve becomes:
max
an∈An
aβnn ·
[
s¯n − λn(an − a¯n)
]
. (29)
For λk > 0, user n believes that increasing an will further reduce its conjectured state s¯n. The optimal
solution of (29) is given by
a∗n =
βn(s¯n + λna¯n)
λn(1 + βn)
. (30)
In the following, we first show that forming simple linear beliefs in (28) can cause all the operating
points in the achievable utility region to be CE.
Theorem 3: For Type II games, all the positive operating points in the utility region U are essentially
CE.
Proof : For each positive operating point (u∗1, . . . , u∗N ) (i.e. u∗n > 0,∀n ∈ N ) in the utility region U ,
there exists at least one joint action profile (a∗1, . . . , a∗N ) ∈ A such that u∗n = un(a∗), ∀n ∈ N . We
consider setting the parameters in the belief functions {s˜n(an)}Nn=1 to be:
λ∗n = βn ·
µ−
∑N
m=1 τma
∗
m
a∗n
,∀n ∈ N . (31)
It is easy to check that, if the reference points are s¯n = µ −
∑N
m=1 τma
∗
m, a¯n = a
∗
n, we have s˜n(a∗n) =
sn(a
∗
1, . . . , a
∗
N ) and a∗n = argmaxan∈An un(s˜n(an), an). Therefore, this belief function configuration and
the joint action a∗ = (a∗1, . . . , a∗N ) constitute the CE that results in the utility (u∗1, . . . , u∗N ). 
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Theorem 3 establishes the existence of CE, i.e. for a particular a∗ ∈ A, how to choose the parameters
{s¯n, a¯n, λn}
N
n=1 such that a∗ is a CE. However, it neither tells us how these CE can be achieved and
sustained in the dynamic setting nor clarifies how different belief configurations can lead to various CE.
We consider the dynamic scenarios in which users revise their reference points based on their past
local observations over time. Let stn, atn, s˜tn, s¯tn, a¯tn be user n’s state, action, belief function, and reference
points at stage t, in which stn = µ −
∑N
m=1 τma
t
m. We propose a simple rule for individual users to
update their reference points. At stage t, user n sets its s¯tn and a¯tn to be st−1n and at−1n . In other words,
user n’s conjectured utility function at stage t is
utn(s˜
t
n(an), an) = a
βn
n ·
[
µ−
N∑
m=1
τma
t−1
m − λn(an − a
t−1
n )
]
. (32)
Since we have defined the users’ utility function at stage t, upon specifying the rule of how user n updates
its action atn based on its utility function utn(s˜tn(an), an), the trajectory of the entire dynamic process
is determined. The remainder of this paper will investigate the dynamic properties of the best response
and Jacobi update mechanisms and the performance trade-off among the competing users at the resulting
steady-state CE. In particular, for fixed {λn}Nn=1, Section IV-C derives necessary and sufficient conditions
for the convergence of the best response and the Jacobi update dynamics. Section IV-D quantitatively
describes the limiting CE for given {λn}Nn=1 and investigates how the parameters {λn}Nn=1 should be
properly chosen such that Pareto efficiency can be achieved.
C. Dynamic Algorithms
1) Best Response: In the best response algorithm, each user updates its action using the best response
that maximizes its conjectured utility function in (32). Therefore, at stage t, user n chooses its action
according to
atn = Bn(a
t−1) :=
βn(µ−
∑
m∈N\{n} τma
t−1
m )
λn(1 + βn)
+
βn(λn − τn)a
t−1
n
λn(1 + βn)
. (33)
We are interested in characterizing the convergence of the update mechanism defined by (33) when using
various λn to initialize the belief function s˜n.
To analyze the convergence of the best response dynamics, we consider the Jacobian matrix of the
self-mapping function in (33). Let Jik denote the element at row i and column k of the Jacobian matrix
J. The elements of the Jacobian matrix JBR of (33) are defined as:
JBRik =
∂ati
∂at−1k
=


βk(λk−τk)
λk(1+βk)
, if i = k,
− βiτkλi(1+βi) , if i 6= k.
(34)
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For Type II games, the following theorem gives a necessary and sufficient condition under which the
best response dynamics defined in (33) converges.
Theorem 4: For Type II games, a necessary and sufficient condition for the best response dynamics
to converge is
N∑
n=1
τnβn
λn(1 + 2βn)
< 1. (35)
Proof : The best response dynamics converges if and only if the eigenvalues {ξBRn }Nn=1 of the Jacobian
matrix JBR in (34) are all inside the unit circle of the complex plane [25], i.e. |ξBRn | < 1,∀n ∈ N . To
determine the eigenvalues of JBR, we have
det(ξI − JBR) =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
ξ − β1(λ1−τ1)λ1(1+β1)
β1τ2
λ1(1+β1)
. . . β1τNλ1(1+β1)
β2τ1
λ2(1+β2)
ξ − β2(λ2−τ2)λ2(1+β2) . . .
β2τN
λ2(1+β2)
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
βNτ1
λN (1+βN )
βNτ2
λN (1+βN )
. . . ξ − βN (λN−τN )λN (1+βN )
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
ξ − β1(λ1−τ1)λ1(1+β1)
τ2
τ1
( β1
1+β1
− ξ
)
. . . τNτ1
( β1
1+β1
− ξ
)
β2τ1
λ2(1+β2)
ξ − β21+β2 . . . 0
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
βNτ1
λN (1+βN )
0 . . . ξ − βN1+βN
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
(
ξ − β11+β1
)
·
[
1−
∑N
n=1
τn
λn(1−
1+βn
βn
ξ)
]
0 . . . 0
β2τ1
λ2(1+β2)
ξ − β21+β2 . . . 0
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
βNτ1
λN (1+βN )
0 . . . ξ − βN1+βN
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
.
Therefore, we can see that, the eigenvalues of JBR are the roots of
[ N∑
n=1
τn
λn(1−
1+βn
βn
ξ)
− 1
]
·
N∏
n=1
(
ξ −
βn
1 + βn
)
= 0. (36)
Denote q(ξ) =
∑N
n=1
τn
λn(1−
1+βn
βn
ξ)
. First, we assume that βi 6= βj ,∀i, j. Without loss of generality, con-
sider β1 < β2 < · · · < βN . In this case, the eigenvalues of JBR are the roots of q(ξ) = 1. Note that q(ξ)
is a continuous function and it strictly increases in (−∞, β11+β1 ), (
β1
1+β1
, β21+β2 ), · · · , (
βN−1
1+βN−1
, βN1+βN ), and
( βN1+βN ,+∞). We also have limξ→( βn1+βn )− q(ξ) = +∞, limξ→(
βn
1+βn
)+ q(ξ) = −∞, n = 1, 2, · · · , N , and
limξ→−∞ q(ξ) = limξ→+∞ q(ξ) = 0. Therefore, the roots of q(ξ) = 1 lie in (−∞, β11+β1 ), (
β1
1+β1
, β21+β2 ),
· · · , ( βN−11+βN−1 ,
βN
1+βN
). Since q(ξ) strictly increases in (−∞, β11+β1 ), we have |ξ
BR
n | < 1,∀n ∈ N if and
only if q(−1) =
∑N
n=1
τnβn
λn(1+2βn)
< 1.
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Second, we consider the cases in which there exists βi = βj for certain i, j. Suppose that {βn}Nn=1 take
K discrete values κ1, · · · , κK and the number of {βn}Nn=1 that equal to κk is nk. In this case, Equation
(36) is reduced to [ N∑
n=1
τn
λn(1−
1+βn
βn
ξ)
− 1
]
·
K∏
k=1
(
ξ −
κk
1 + κk
)nk = 0. (37)
Hence, equation q(ξ) = 1 has N +K −
∑K
k=1 nk roots in total, and ξ = κk1+κk is a root of multiplicity
nk − 1 for Equation (37), ∀k. All these roots are the eigenvalues of matrix JBR. Similarly, the roots of
q(ξ) = 1 lie in (−∞, κ11+κ1 ), (
κ1
1+κ1
, κ21+κ2 ), · · · , (
κK−1
1+κK−1
, κK1+κK ). A necessary and sufficient condition
under which |ξBRn | < 1,∀n ∈ N is still q(−1) < 1, i.e.
∑N
n=1
τnβn
λn(1+2βn)
< 1. 
Remark 2: Theorem 4 indicates that, if the condition in (35) is satisfied, the best response dynamics
converges linearly to the CE. The convergence rate is mainly determined by maxn∈N |ξBRn |. Suppose
β1 < β2 < · · · < βN and ξBR1 < ξBR2 < · · · < ξBRN . From the proof of Theorem 4, we can see
that, under condition (35), −1 < ξBR1 < β11+β1 < ξBR2 < · · · < ξBRN , and
βN−1
1+βN−1
< ξBRN <
βN
1+βN
.
Therefore, the rate of convergence can be approximated by max{|ξBR1 |, |ξBRN |}. Note that choosing
larger {λn}Nn=1 increases ξBR1 . Hence, if −1 < ξBR1 < −|ξBRN |, increasing {λn}Nn=1, i.e. having more
self-constraint users, accelerate the convergence rate of the best response mechanism. On the other hand,
since ξBRN >
βN−1
1+βN−1
, the convergence rate is lower bounded by βN−11+βN−1 . Therefore, if more than two
users associate large weighting factors β with their individual actions in the utility functions, we have
βN−1
1+βN−1
→ 1 and the best response dynamics converges slowly.
Remark 3: Theorem 4 generalizes the necessary and sufficient condition derived in [22], where users
are assumed to be symmetric, i.e. τn = 1,∀n and they adopt the Nash strategy by choosing λn = τn,∀n.
Due to lack of symmetry, the derivation in [22] is not readily applicable to analyze the convergence of
the best response dynamics. The proof of Theorem 4 instead directly characterizes the eigenvalues of
the Jacobian matrix, and hence, provides a more general convergence analysis of the dynamic algorithms
that allow users to update their actions based on their independent linear conjectures.
Remark 4: In Type II games, a locally stable CE is also globally convergent, which is purely due to
the property of its utility functions specified in (18). From (34), we can see that all the elements in JBR
are independent of the joint play at−1. This is in contrast with Type I games considered in [15], where
local stability of a CE may not imply its global convergence and the best response dynamics may only
converge if the operating point is close enough to the steady-state equilibrium.
2) Jacobi Update: We consider another alternative strategy update mechanism called Jacobi update
[23]. In Jacobi update, every user adjusts its action gradually towards the best response strategy. At stage
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t, user n chooses its action according to
atn = Jn(a
t−1) := at−1n + ǫ
[
Bn(a
t−1)− at−1n
]
, (38)
in which the stepsize ǫ > 0 and Bn(at−1) is defined in (33). The following theorem establishes the
convergence property of the Jacobi update dynamics.
Theorem 5: In Type II games, for given {τn, βn, λn}Nn=1, the Jacobi update dynamics converges if the
stepsize ǫ is sufficiently small.
Proof : The Jacobian matrix JJU of the self-mapping function (38) satisfies JJU = (1 − ǫ)I + ǫJBR.
Therefore, its eigenvalues {ξJUn }Nn=1 are given by ξJUn = 1 − ǫ+ ǫξBRn . From the proof of Theorem 4,
we know that ξBRn < 1,∀n ∈ N . Therefore, if ǫ < 21−minn ξBRn , we have ξ
JU
n ∈ (−1, 1),∀n ∈ N and the
Jacobi update dynamics converges. 
Remark 5: Theorem 5 indicates that, for any {τn, βn, λn}Nn=1 > 0, the Jacobi update mechanism
globally converges to a CE as long as the stepsize is set to be a small enough positive number. In other
words, the small stepsize in the Jacobi update can compensate for the instability of the best response
dynamics even though the necessary and sufficient condition in (35) is not satisfied.
D. Stability of the Pareto Boundary
In order to understand how to properly choose the parameters {λn}Nn=1 such that it leads to efficient
outcomes, we need to explicitly describe the steady-state CE in terms of the parameters {λn}Nn=1 of the
belief functions. Denote the joint action profile at CE as (a∗1, . . . , a∗N ). From Equation (33), we know
that
(λn + βnτn)a
∗
n +
∑
m∈N\{n}
βnτma
∗
m = βnµ,∀n ∈ N . (39)
The solutions of the above linear equations are
aCEn =
βnµ
λn(1 +
∑N
m=1
τmβm
λm
)
,∀n ∈ N . (40)
Based on the closed-form expression of the CE, the following theorem indicates the stability of the Pareto
boundary in Type II games.
Theorem 6: For Type II games, all the operating points on the Pareto boundary are globally convergent
CE under the best response dynamics.
Proof : Comparing Equations (23) and (40), we can see that, (aCE1 , . . . , aCEN ) = (aPB1 , . . . , aPBN ) if
and only if λn = τn/ωn. Substitute it into the LHS of (35):
N∑
n=1
τnβn
λn(1 + 2βn)
=
N∑
n=1
ωnβn
1 + 2βn
<
∑N
n=1 ωn
2
=
1
2
. (41)
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Condition (35) is satisfied for all the Pareto-optimal operating points. In fact, we have minn ξBRn = 0,
which is because q(0) =
∑N
n=1
τn
λn
=
∑N
n=1 ωn = 1. Therefore, under the best response dynamics, the
Pareto boundary is globally convergent. 
In addition, we also note that Theorem 5 already indicates the stability of the Pareto boundary under
Jacobi update as long as the parameters {τn, βn, λn}Nn=1 are properly chosen.
Remark 6: Since
∑N
n=1 ωn = 1, we can see from the previous proof that, the belief configurations
{λn}
N
n=1 lead to Pareto-optimal operating points if and only if
N∑
n=1
τn
λn
= 1. (42)
Therefore, we can see that, to achieve Pareto-optimality in these non-cooperative scenarios, users need
to choose the belief parameters {λn}Nn=1 to be greater than or equal to the parameters {τn}Nn=1 in the
utility function {un}Nn=1 and the summation of τnλn should be equal to 1. Define user n’s conservativeness
as τnλn , which reflects the ratio between the immediate performance degradation −τn∆an in the actual
utility function and the long-term effect −λn∆an in the conjectured utility function if user n increases
its action by ∆an. The condition in Equation (42) indicates that, to achieve efficient outcomes, the
non-collaborative users need to jointly maintain moderate conservativeness by considering the multi-
user coupling and appropriately choosing {λn}Nn=1. By “moderate”, we mean that users are neither too
aggressive, i.e. λn → τn and
∑N
n=1
τn
λn
→ N , nor too conservative, i.e. λn → +∞ and
∑N
n=1
τn
λn
→ 0.
If more than one user plays the Nash strategy and choose λn = τn, Equation (42) does not hold and the
resulting operating point is not Pareto-optimal. Therefore, myopic selfish behavior is detrimental.
Similarly as in (24), we have
N∑
n=1
ωn log
un(a
CE)
un(aPB)
=
N∑
n=1
ωnβn log
τn(1 +
∑N
j=1 ωjβj)
λnωn(1 +
∑N
j=1
τjβj
λj
)
+ log
1 +
∑N
j=1 ωjβj
1 +
∑N
j=1
τjβj
λj
. (43)
Using Jensen’s inequality, we can conclude
∑N
n=1 ωn log
un(aCE)
un(aPB)
≤ 0 and
∑N
n=1 ωn log
un(aCE)
un(aPB)
= 0
if and only if ωn = τnλn ,∀n. Therefore, if a CE is Pareto efficient, user n’s conservativeness τn/λn
corresponds to the weight assigned to user n in the weighted proportional fairness defined in (10).
As an illustrative example, we simulate a three-user system with parameters β = [1.5 1 0.5], τ =
[3 4 5], µ = 10, ωn =
1
3 ,∀n. In this case, the joint actions and the corresponding utilities at NE and Pareto
boundary are summarized in Table I. The price of anarchy quantified according to (27) is −0.2877 and
the lower bound in (27) is −0.5754. As discussed in Section III.C, both the upper bound and lower
bound in (27) are not tight. Fig. 1 shows the trajectory of the action updates under both best response
and Jacobi update dynamics, in which a0n = 0.5, λn = τnωn ,∀n, and ǫ = 0.5. The best response update
17
converges to the Pareto-optimal operating point in around 8 iterations and the Jacobi update experiences
a smoother trajectory and the same equilibrium is attained after more iterations.
E. Discussions
1) Comparison between Type I and Type II games: As mentioned before, the properties of Type I
games have been investigated in the context of wireless random access [15]. Table II summarizes some
similarities and differences between both types of games. First, the two algorithms exhibit different
properties under the best response dynamics. In Type I games, the stable CE may not be globally
convergent. However, the local stability of a CE implies its global convergence in Type II games. Second,
it is shown in [15] that any operating point that is arbitrarily close to the Pareto boundary of the utility
region of Type I games is a stable CE. Similarly, the entire Pareto boundary of Type II games is also stable.
At last, different relationships between the parameter selection and the achieved utility at equilibrium
have been observed for the two types of games. In particular, in Type I games, user n’s utility un is
approximately proportional to the inverse of the parameter λn in its belief function. In contrast, in Type
II games, if the CE is Pareto-optimal, the ratio τn/λn coincide with the weight ωn assigned to user n
in the proportional fairness objective function. In other words, based on the definition of proportional
fairness [26], we know
N∑
n=1
τn(u
′
n − u
∗
n)
λnu∗n
≤ 0, (44)
in which (u′1, u′2, . . . , u′N ) is the users’ achieved utility associated with any other feasible joint action and
(u∗1, u
∗
2, . . . , u
∗
N ) is the optimal achieved utility for problem (10) with ωn = τn/λn and
∑N
n=1 ωn = 1.
2) Pricing Mechanism vs. Conjectural Equilibrium: In order to achieve Pareto-optimality, information
exchanges among users is generally required in order to collaboratively maximize the system efficiency.
The existing cooperative communication scenarios either assume that the information about all the users
is gathered by a trusted moderator (e.g. access point, base station, selected network leader etc.), to which
it is given the authority to centrally divide the available resources among the participating users, or, in
the distributed setting, users exchange price signals (e.g. the Lagrange multipliers for the dual problem)
that reflect the “cost” for consuming per unit constrained resources to maximize the social welfare and
reach Pareto-optimal allocations. As an important tool, the pricing mechanism has been applied in the
distributed optimization of various communication networks [12]. However, we would like to point out
that, the pricing mechanism generally requires repeated coordination information exchange among users
in order to determine the optimal actions and achieve the Pareto-optimality. In contrast, for the linear
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coupled communication games, since the specific structure of the utility function is explored, the CE
approach is able to calculate the Pareto efficient operating point in a distributed manner, without any real-
time information exchange among users. In fact, the underlying coordination is implicitly implemented
when the participating users initialize their belief parameters. Once the belief parameters are properly
initialized by the protocol according to (42), using the proposed dynamic update algorithms, individual
users are able to achieve the Pareto-optimal CE solely based on their individual local observations on
their states and no message exchange is needed during the convergence process. Therefore, the conjecture
equilibrium approach is an important alternative to the pricing-based approach in the linearly coupled
games.
V. CONCLUSION
We derive the structure of the utility functions in the multi-user communication scenarios where a user’s
action has proportionally the same impact over other users’ utilities. The performance gap between NE
and Pareto boundary of the utility region is explicitly characterized. To improve the performance in
non-cooperative cases, we investigate a CE approach which endows users with simple linear beliefs
which enables them to select an equilibrium outcome that is efficient without the need of explicit
message exchanges. The properties of the CE under both the best response and Jacobi dynamic update
mechanisms are characterized. We show that the entire Pareto boundary in linearly coupled games is
globally convergent CE which can be achieved by both studied dynamic algorithms without the need
of real-time message passing. A potential future direction is to see how to extend the CE approach to
the general linearly coupled games that are compositions of the basic two types and certain particular
non-linearly coupled multi-user communication scenarios.
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Fig. 1. The trajectory of the best response and Jacobi update dynamics.
TABLE I
ACTIONS AND PAYOFFS AT NE AND PARETO BOUNDARY.
User 1 User 2 User 3
aNEi 1.25 0.625 0.25
uNEi 3.4939 1.5625 1.25
aPBi 0.833 0.417 0.167
uPBi 3.8036 2.0833 2.0412
TABLE II
COMPARISON BETWEEN TYPE I AND TYPE II GAMES.
Games Best response dynamics Stability vs. efficiency Fairness vs. parameter selection
Type I local stability ⇐ global convergence stable at near-Pareto-optimal points un ∝ τn/λn
Type II local stability ⇔ global convergence stable at the Pareto boundary ωn = τn/λn at the Pareto boundary
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Linearly Coupled Communication Games
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Abstract
This paper discusses a special type of multi-user communication scenario, in which users’ utilities
are linearly impacted by their competitors’ actions. First, we explicitly characterize the Nash equilibrium
and Pareto boundary of the achievable utility region. Second, the price of anarchy incurred by the
non-collaborative Nash strategy is quantified. Third, to improve the performance in the non-cooperative
scenarios, we investigate the properties of an alternative solution concept named conjectural equilibrium,
in which individual users compensate for their lack of information by forming internal beliefs about
their competitors. The global convergence of the best response and Jacobi update dynamics that achieve
various conjectural equilibria are analyzed. It is shown that the Pareto boundaries of the investigated
linearly coupled games can be sustained as stable conjectural equilibria if the belief functions are properly
initialized. The investigated models apply to a variety of realistic applications encountered in the multiple
access design, including wireless random access and flow control.
Index Terms
Nash equilibrium, Pareto-optimality, conjectural equilibrium, non-cooperative games.
I. INTRODUCTION
Game theory provides a formal framework for studying the interactions of strategic agents. Recently,
there has been a surge in research activities that employ game theory to model and analyze a wide range
of application scenarios in modern communication networks [1]- [4]. In communication networks, any
action taken by a single user usually affects the utilities of the other users sharing the same resources.
Depending on the characteristics of different applications, numerous game-theoretical models and solution
concepts have been proposed to describe the multi-user interactions and optimize the users’ decisions in
communication networks. Roughly speaking, the existing multi-user research can be categorized into two
types, non-cooperative games and cooperative games. Various game theoretic solutions were developed
2to characterize the resulting performance of the multi-user interaction, including the Nash Equilibrium
(NE) and the Pareto-optimality [18].
Non-cooperative approaches generally assume that the participating users simply choose actions to
selfishly maximize their individual utility functions. It is well-known that if devices operate in a non-
cooperative manner, this will generally limit their performance as well as that of the whole system, because
the available resources are not always efficiently exploited due to the conflicts of interest occurring among
users [5]. Most non-cooperative approaches are devoted to investigating the existence and properties of
the NE. In particular, several non-cooperative game models, such as S-modular games, congestion games,
and potential games, have been extensively applied in various communication scenarios [6]- [9]. The price
of anarchy, a measure of how good the system performance is when users play selfishly and reach the
NE instead of playing to achieve the social optimum, has also been addressed in several communication
network applications [10] [11].
On the other hand, cooperative approaches in communication theory usually focus on studying how
users can jointly improve their performance when they cooperate. For example, the users may optimize a
common objective function, which represents the Pareto-optimal social welfare allocation rule based on
which the system-wide resource allocation is performed [12] [13]. A profile of actions is Pareto-optimal
if there is no other profile of actions that makes every player at least as well off and at least one player
strictly better off. Allocation rules, e.g. network utility maximization, can provide reasonable allocation
outcomes by considering the trade-off between fairness and efficiency. Most cooperative approaches focus
on studying how to efficiently find the optimum joint policy. It is worth mentioning that information
exchanges among users is generally required to enable users to coordinate in order to achieve and sustain
Pareto-efficient outcomes.
In this paper, we present a game model for a particular type of non-cooperative multi-user communi-
cation scenario. We name it linearly coupled communication games, because users’ utilities are linearly
impacted by their competitors’ actions. In particular, the main contributions of this paper are as follows.
First, based on the assumptions that we make about the properties of users’ utility, we characterize
the inherent structures of the utility functions for the linearly coupled games. Furthermore, based on
the derived utility forms, we explicitly quantify the NE and Pareto boundary for the linearly coupled
communication games. The price of anarchy incurred by the selfish users playing the Nash strategy is
quantified. In addition, to improve the performance in the non-cooperative scenarios, we investigate an
alternative solution: conjectural equilibrium (CE). Using this approach, individual users are modeled as
belief-forming agents that develop internal beliefs about their competitors and behave optimally with
3respect to their individual beliefs. Necessary and sufficient conditions that guarantee the convergence of
different dynamic update mechanisms, including the best response and Jacobi update, are addressed. We
prove that these adjustment processes based on conjectures and non-cooperative individual optimization
can be globally driven to Pareto-optimality in the linearly coupled games without the need of real-time
coordination information exchange among agents.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II defines the linearly coupled communication
games. For the investigated game models, Section III explicitly computes the NE and Pareto boundary
of the achievable utility region and quantifies the price of anarchy. Section IV introduces the CE and
investigates its properties under both the best response and Jacobi update dynamics. Conclusions are
drawn in Section V.
II. GAME MODEL
In this section, we first provide a general game-theoretic formulation of the multi-user interaction in
communication systems. Following the proposed definition, we define the linearly coupled communication
games and provide concrete examples of the investigated game model.
A. Linearly Coupled Communication Games
The multi-user game in various communication scenarios can be formally defined as a tuple Γ =
〈N ,A, u,S, s〉. In particular, N = {1, 2, . . . , N} is the set of communication devices, which are the
rational decision-makers in the system. Define A to be the joint action space A = ×n∈NAn, with An
being the action set available for user n. As opposed to the traditional strategic game definition [18],
we introduce two new elements S and s into the game formulation. Specifically, S is the state space
S = ×n∈NSn, where Sn ⊆ R+ is the part of the state relevant to user n. The state is defined to
capture the effects of the multi-user coupling such that each user’s utility solely depends on its own state
and action. In other words, the utility function u = ×n∈Nun is a mapping from the individual users’
state space and action space to real numbers, un : Sn × An → R. The state determination function
s = ×n∈N sn maps joint actions to states for each component sn : A→ Sn. To capture the performance
tradeoff, the utility region is defined as U = {(u1(a), . . . , uN (a))| ∃ a = (a1, a2, . . . , aN ) ∈ A}.
Definition 1: A multi-user interaction is considered a linearly coupled communication game if the
action set An ⊆ R+ is convex and the utility function un satisfies:
un(a) = a
βn
n · sn(a), (1)
4in which βn > 0. In particular, the basic assumptions about sn(a) include:
A1: sn(a) is non-negative;
A2: Denote s′nm(a) =
∂sn(a)
∂am
and s′′nm(a) =
∂2sn(a)
∂a2m
. sn(a) is strictly linear decreasing in am,∀m 6= n,
i.e. s′nm(a) < 0 and s′′nm(a) = 0; sn(a) is non-increasing and linear in an, i.e. s′nn(a) ≤ 0 and s′′nn(a) = 0.
A3: sn(a)s′nm(a) is an affine function, ∀n ∈ N \ {m}.
A4: s
′
nm(a)
sn(a)
=
s′km(a)
sk(a)
,∀n, k ∈ N \ {m}; s
′
mm(a)
sm(a)
= 0 or s
′
nm(a)
sn(a)
, ∀n 6= m.
Assumptions A1 and A2 indicate that increasing am for any m 6= n within the domain of sn(a) will
linearly decrease user n’s utility. Assumptions A3 and A4 imply that a user’s action has proportionally
the same impact over the other users’ utility. The structure of the utility functions that satisfy assumptions
A1-A4 will be addressed in Section III.
B. Illustrative Examples
There are a number of multi-user communication scenarios that can be modeled as linearly coupled
communication games. For example, in the random access scenario [15], the action of a node is to
select its transmission probability and a node n will independently attempt transmission of a packet with
transmit probability pn. The action set available to node n is An = [0, 1] for all n ∈ N . In this case, the
utility function is defined as
un(p) = pn ·
∏
m6=n
(1− pm). (2)
As an additional example, in flow control [16], N Poisson streams of packets are serviced by a single
exponential server with departure rate µ and each class can adjust its throughput rn. The utility function
is defined as the weighted ratio of the throughput over the average experienced delay:
un(r) = r
βn
n · (µ −
N∑
m=1
rm), (3)
in which βn > 0 is interpreted as the weighting factor. Specifically, we can see that the state determination
functions are sn(p) =
∏
m∈N\{n}(1− pm) in (2) and sn(r) = µ−
∑N
m=1 rm in (3). It is straightforward
to verify that these functions satisfy assumptions A1-A4 for both (2) and (3).
In this paper, we are interested in comparing the achievable performance attained by different game-
theoretic solution concepts. On one hand, it is well-known that NE is generally inefficient in com-
munication games [17], but it may not require explicit message exchanges, while Pareto-optimality can
usually be achieved only by exchanging implicit or explicit coordination messages among the participating
users. On the other hand, in several recent works [14] [15], we have applied an alternative solution
5in different communication scenarios to improve the system performance in non-cooperative settings,
namely the conjectural equilibrium [21]. The following sections aim to compare the solutions of NE,
Pareto boundary, and CE in terms of the payoffs and informational requirements in the linearly coupled
multi-user interaction satisfying the assumptions A1-A4.
III. COMPUTATION OF THE NASH EQUILIBRIUM AND PARETO BOUNDARY FOR LINEARLY COUPLED
GAMES
In this section, we show that the computation of the NE and the Pareto boundary in linearly coupled
games is equivalent to solving linear equations. Specifically, we investigate the inherent structures of the
utility functions satisfying assumptions A1-A4 and define two basic types of linearly coupled games. The
performance loss incurred by the Nash strategy are quantified for Type II games.
A. Nash Equilibrium
In non-cooperative games, the participating users simply choose actions to selfishly maximize their
individual utility functions. The steady state outcome of such interactions is an operating point, at which
given the other users’ actions, no user can increase its utility alone by unilaterally changing its action.
This operating point is known as the Nash equilibrium, which is formally defined below [18].
Definition 2: A profile a of actions constitutes a Nash equilibrium of Γ if un(an,a−n) ≥ un(a′n,a−n)
for all a′n ∈ An and n ∈ N .
We are interested in computing the NE in the linear coupled games. From equation (1), we have
∂ log[un(a)]
∂am
=


βn/an + s
′
nn(a)/sn(a), if m = n;
s′nm(a)/sn(a), otherwise.
(4)
On one hand, if s′nn(a) = 0,∀n ∈ N , since user n’s utility function strictly increases in an, we have
trivial NE at which a∗n is the maximal element in An that lies in the domain of s(·), ∀n ∈ N .
On the other hand, if s′nn(a) 6= 0,∀n ∈ N , according to assumption A3, since the multi-user
interactions are linearly coupled, we have
sn(a) = f
m
n (a−m) + g
m
n (a−m)am, (5)
where fmn (a−m), gmn (a−m) are both polynomials and gnn(a−n) 6= 0. From this, it follows
s′nn(a)
sn(a)
=
[
fnn (a−n)
gnn(a−n)
+ an
]−1
. (6)
6At NE, we have
∂ log[un(a)]
∂an
= 0,∀n ∈ N . (7)
Under assumption A3 and A4, f
n
n (a−n)
gnn(a−n)
is a affine function, which enables us to explicitly characterize
the NE. Denote f
n
n (a−n)
gnn(a−n)
= hn(a−n). Equation (7) can be rewritten as
βn · hn(a−n) + (βn + 1) · an = 0,∀n ∈ N . (8)
Therefore, the solutions of Equations (8) are the NE of the linearly coupled games and computing the
NE is equivalent to solving N -dimension linear equations. The following theorem indicates the inherent
structure of the utility functions {un}Nn=1 when the requirements A1-A3 are satisfied.
Theorem 1: Under assumptions A1-A3, the irreducible factors of sn(a) over the integers are affine
functions and have no variables in common.
Proof : Denote the factorization of sn(a) as
sn(a) =
Mn∏
i=1
bin(a), (9)
in which Mn represents the number of the non-constant irreducible factors in sn(a). Define V(·) as the
mapping from a polynomial to the set of variables that appear in that polynomial. Based on assumption
A2, we immediately have
V(bin(a)) ∩V(b
j
n(a)) = ∅,∀i, j(j 6= i), n.
Without loss of generality, we assume that aj ∈ V(b1n(a)) and b1n(a) = f
j
b1n
(a−j) + g
j
b1n
(a−j)aj . Then
f jn(a−j), g
j
n(a−j) in (5) are given by
f jn(a−j) = f
j
b1n
(a−j) ·
Mn∏
i=2
bin(a), and gjn(a−j) = g
j
b1n
(a−j) ·
Mn∏
i=2
bin(a).
Therefore, f
m
n (a−m)
gmn (a−m)
=
fj
b1n
(a−j)
gj
b1n
(a−j)
. By assumption A3, we have that the degree of
fj
b1n
(a−j)
gj
b1n
(a−j)
is less than or
equal to 1. Since b1n(a) is irreducible, we can conclude that g
j
b1n
(a−j) is a constant and the degree of
f jb1n
(a−j) is less than or equal to 1. Note that the arguments above hold, ∀j, n. Therefore, the degree of
bin(a) is one, ∀n ∈ N , i = 1, . . . ,Mn, which concludes the proof. 
B. Pareto Boundary
Since log(·) is concave and log[un(a)] is a composition of affine functions [19], un(a) is log-concave
in a and the log-utility region logU is convex. Therefore, we can characterize the Pareto boundary of
7the utility region as a set of a optimizing the following weighted proportional fairness objective1:
max
a
N∑
n=1
ωn log[un(a)], (10)
for all possible sets of {ωn} satisfying ωn ≥ 0 and
∑N
n=1 ωn = 1. Denote the optimal solution of problem
(10) as aPB, which satisfies the following first-order condition:
∂
∑N
k=1 ωk log[uk(a)]
∂an
∣∣∣∣
a=aPB
= 0,∀n ∈ N , (11)
Under assumptions A1-A3, the LHS of equation (11) can be rewritten as
∂
∑N
k=1 ωk log[uk(a)]
∂am
= ωm
(
βm
am
+
s′mm(a)
sm(a)
)
+
∑
k 6=m
ωk
s′km(a)
sk(a)
. (12)
By Theorem 1 and assumption A4, we have
s′km(a)
sk(a)
=
1
ψm(a)
, ∀k ∈ N \ {m}, (13)
in which ψm(a) is a affine function. Therefore, equation (12) is equivalent to
∂
∑N
k=1 ωk log[uk(a)]
∂am
=


βmωm/am + (1− ωm)/ψm(a), if s
′
mm(a) = 0;
βmωm/am + 1/ψm(a), otherwise.
(14)
We can compute the Pareto boundary of the linearly coupled games by solving linear equations:
∂
∑N
k=1 ωk log[uk(a)]
∂am
= 0⇒


βmωmψm(a) + (1− ωm)am = 0, if s
′
mm(a) = 0;
βmωmψm(a) + am = 0, otherwise.
(15)
Theorem 1 reveals the structural properties of the utility functions {un}Nn=1 when assumption A1-A3
are satisfied. Based on Theorem 1, the following theorem further refines these properties of {un}Nn=1
when the additional assumption A4 is imposed.
Theorem 2: Under assumptions A1-A4, for any polynomial bin(a) in the factorization sn(a) =
∏Mn
i=1 b
i
n(a),
∀n ∈ N , if |V(bin(a))| ≥ 2 or V(bin(a)) = {an}, bin(a) is an irreducible factor of sm(a), ∀m ∈ N ; if
V(bin(a)) = {am},m 6= n, b
i
n(a) is an irreducible factor of sj(a), ∀j ∈ N/{m}.
Proof : By assumption A2, s′nm(a) < 0,∀m 6= n, we have |V(sn(a))| ≥ N − 1,∀n ∈ N . By
Theorem 1, the irreducible factors of sn(a) have no common variables and they are affine functions.
Suppose |V(bin(a))| ≥ 2 and {am, al} ∈ V(bin(a). By assumption A4, we know that
s′nm(a)
sn(a)
=
s′km(a)
sk(a)
=
b′inm(a)
bin(a)
,∀n, k ∈ N \ {m}. Therefore, it follows
sk(a) =
s′km(a)b
i
n(a)
b′inm(a)
. (16)
1Note that the utility region U is not necessarily convex. Therefore, its Pareto boundary may not be characterized by the
weighted sum of {un(a)}Nn=1.
8Since b′inm(a) is a constant, we can see that bin(a) is an irreducible factor of sk(a), ∀k ∈ N \ {m}.
By symmetry, we can conclude that bin(a) must also be an irreducible factor of sk(a), ∀k ∈ N \ {l}.
Therefore, bin(a) is an irreducible factor of sk(a), ∀k ∈ N . Similarly, we can prove the remaining parts
of Theorem 2. 
Remark 1: For the linearly coupled games satisfying assumptions A1-A4, suppose we factorize all
users’ state functions. Theorem 2 indicates that any factor with at least two variables must be a common
factor of all the users’ state functions, and any factor with a single variable ak must be a common factor
of state functions for users excluding k. In reality, it corresponds to the communication scenarios in
which the state, i.e. the multi-user coupling, is impacted by a set of users that result in a similar signal
to all the users.
We define two basic types of linearly coupled games satisfying the assumptions A1-A4. In Type I
games, user k’s action linearly decreases all the users’ states but itself. Hence, the utility functions take
the form
un(a) = a
βn
n ·
∏
m6=n
(µm − τmam). (17)
In Type II games, all the users share the same non-factorizable state function and their utility functions
are given by
un(a) = a
βn
n · (µ−
N∑
m=1
τmam). (18)
As special examples, the random access problem in (2) belongs to Type I games and the rate control
problem in (3) belongs to Type II games. In fact, all the games that have the properties A1-A4 can be
viewed as compositions of these two basic types of games (See the example in Remark 1). Therefore,
investigating the two basic types provides us the fundamental understanding of the linearly coupled multi-
user interaction. A brief summary of the properties of Type I games will be provided in Section IV.E.
For the details about its various game-theoretic solutions, we refer the readers to [15] and the references
therein. The rest of this paper will focus on Type II games.
C. Nash Equilibrium and Pareto Boundary in Type II Games
For Type II games with utility functions given in (18), we have
s′nn(a)
sn(a)
=
−τn
µ−
∑N
m=1 τmam
. (19)
Therefore, Equation (8) can be reduced to
(1 + βn)τnan + βn
∑
m6=n
τmam = βnµ,∀n ∈ N . (20)
9The solution of the linear equations gives the NE, and its closed form has been addressed in [22] for
τn = 1,∀n ∈ N . For the general case, it is easy to verify that the NE is given by
aNEn =
βnµ
τn(1 +
∑N
m=1 βm)
,∀n ∈ N . (21)
Similarly, to compute the Pareto boundary of Type II games, Equation (14) can be reduced to
(1 + ωnβn)τnan + ωnβn
∑
m6=n
τmam = ωnβnµ,∀n ∈ N . (22)
The solution is given by
aPBn =
ωnβnµ
τn(1 +
∑N
m=1 ωmβm)
,∀n ∈ N . (23)
From Section II.B, we know that the region log U is convex. Therefore, we can compare the efficiency
of aNE and aPB using the system-utility metric
∑N
n=1 ωn log[un(a)]. Specifically, we have
N∑
n=1
ωn log
un(a
NE)
un(aPB)
=
N∑
n=1
ωnβn log
1 +
∑N
j=1 ωjβj
ωn(1 +
∑N
j=1 βj)
+ log
1 +
∑N
j=1 ωjβj
1 +
∑N
j=1 βj
. (24)
Denote w0 = 1, x0 =
1+
P
N
j=1
ωjβj
1+
P
N
j=1
βj
, wn = ωnβn, and xn =
1+
P
N
j=1
ωjβj
ωn(1+
P
N
j=1
βj)
,∀n ∈ N . Therefore,
N∑
n=1
ωn log
un(a
NE)
un(aPB)
=
N∑
n=1
wn log xn + w0 log x0 =
N∑
n=0
wn · log (
N∏
n=0
xwnn )
1/
P
N
n=0
wn . (25)
Using the inequalities among the arithmetic, geometric and harmonic means [24], we have
(1 +
∑N
n=1 ωnβn)
2
(1 +
∑N
n=1 ω
2
nβn)(1 +
∑N
n=1 βn)
=
∑N
n=0wn∑N
n=0
wn
xn
≤
( N∏
n=0
xwnn
) 1P
N
n=0
wn ≤
∑N
n=0 xnwn∑N
n=0 wn
= 1. (26)
Both inequalities hold with equality if and only if x0 = x1 = . . . = xN , i.e. ω1 = . . . = ωN = 1.
However, since we require
∑N
n=1 ωn = 1, (26) holds as strict inequalities, which leads to
(1 +
N∑
n=1
ωnβn) · log
(1 +
∑N
n=1 ωnβn)
2
(1 +
∑N
n=1 ω
2
nβn)(1 +
∑N
n=1 βn)
<
N∑
n=1
ωn log
un(a
NE)
un(aPB)
< 0. (27)
Based on Equation (27), we can make two important observations. First, due to the lack of coordination,
the NE in Type II games is always strictly Pareto inefficient. Second, as opposed to Type I games where
NE may result in zero utility for certain users [15], the efficiency loss in Type II games are lower bounded,
which means that every user receives positive payoff at NE. Noticing that the performance gap between
un(a
NE) and un(aPB) is non-zero, we will investigate how the non-cooperative CE solution can improve
the system performance for Type II games.
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IV. CONJECTURAL EQUILIBRIUM FOR THE LINEARLY COUPLED GAMES
A. Definitions
In game-theoretic analysis, conclusions about the reached equilibria are based on assumptions about
what knowledge the players possess. For example, the standard NE strategy assumes that every player
believes that the other players’ actions will not change at NE. Therefore, it chooses to myopically
maximize its immediate payoff [18]. Therefore, the players operating at equilibrium can be viewed as
decision makers behaving optimally with respect to their beliefs about the strategies of other players.
To avoid detrimental Nash strategy and encourage cooperation, the conjecture-based model has been
introduced by Wellman and others [20] [21] to enable non-cooperative players to build belief models
about how their competitors’ reactions vary in response to their own action changes. Specifically, each
player has some belief about the state that would result from performing its available actions. The belief
function s˜n is defined to be s˜n : An → Sn such that s˜n(an) represents the state that player n believes it
would result in if it selects action an . Notice that the beliefs are not expressed in terms of other players’
actions and preferences, and the multi-user coupling in these beliefs is captured indirectly by individual
players forming conjectures of the effects of their own actions. By deploying such a behavior model,
players will no longer adopt myopic behaviors that do not forecast s˜n, but rather they will form beliefs
s˜n(an) about how their actions an will influence the aggregate effects s˜n incurred by their competitors’
responses and, based on these beliefs, they will choose the action an ∈ An if it believes that this action
will maximize its utility. The steady state of such a play among belief-forming agents can be characterized
as a conjectural equilibria.
Definition 3: In the game Γ, a configuration of belief functions (s˜∗1, . . . , s˜∗N ) and a joint action a∗ =
(a∗1, . . . , a
∗
N ) constitute a conjectural equilibrium, if for each n ∈ N ,
s˜∗n(a
∗
n) = sn(a
∗
1, . . . , a
∗
N ) and a∗n = arg max
an∈An
un(s˜
∗
n(an), an).
From the above definition, we can see that, at CE, all players’ expectations based on their beliefs are
realized and each agent behaves optimally according to its expectation. In other words, agents’ beliefs
are consistent with the outcome of the play and they use “conjectured best responses” in their individual
optimization program. The key challenges are how to configure the belief functions such that cooperation
can be sustained in such a non-cooperative setting and how to design the evolution rules such that the
communication system can dynamically converge to a CE having satisfactory performance.
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B. Linear Beliefs
As discussed before, the belief functions need to be defined in order to investigate the existence of CE.
To define the belief functions, we need to express agent n’s expected state s˜n as a function of its own
action an. The simplest approach is to design linear belief models for each user, i.e. player n’s belief
function takes the form
s˜n(an) = s¯n − λn(an − a¯n), (28)
for n ∈ N . The values of s¯n and a¯n are specific states and actions, called reference points and λn is
a positive scalar. In other words, user n assumes that other players will observe its deviation from its
reference point a¯n and the aggregate state deviates from the reference point s¯n by a quantity proportional
to the deviation of an − a¯n. How to configure s¯n, a¯n, and λn will be addressed in the rest of this paper.
We focus on the linear belief represented in (28), because this simple belief form is sufficient to drive
the resulting non-cooperative equilibrium to the Pareto boundary.
The goal of user n is to maximize its expected utility aβnn · s˜n(an) taking into account the conjectures
that it has made about the other users. Therefore, the optimization a user needs to solve becomes:
max
an∈An
aβnn ·
[
s¯n − λn(an − a¯n)
]
. (29)
For λk > 0, user n believes that increasing an will further reduce its conjectured state s¯n. The optimal
solution of (29) is given by
a∗n =
βn(s¯n + λna¯n)
λn(1 + βn)
. (30)
In the following, we first show that forming simple linear beliefs in (28) can cause all the operating
points in the achievable utility region to be CE.
Theorem 3: For Type II games, all the positive operating points in the utility region U are essentially
CE.
Proof : For each positive operating point (u∗1, . . . , u∗N ) (i.e. u∗n > 0,∀n ∈ N ) in the utility region U ,
there exists at least one joint action profile (a∗1, . . . , a∗N ) ∈ A such that u∗n = un(a∗), ∀n ∈ N . We
consider setting the parameters in the belief functions {s˜n(an)}Nn=1 to be:
λ∗n = βn ·
µ−
∑N
m=1 τma
∗
m
a∗n
,∀n ∈ N . (31)
It is easy to check that, if the reference points are s¯n = µ −
∑N
m=1 τma
∗
m, a¯n = a
∗
n, we have s˜n(a∗n) =
sn(a
∗
1, . . . , a
∗
N ) and a∗n = argmaxan∈An un(s˜n(an), an). Therefore, this belief function configuration and
the joint action a∗ = (a∗1, . . . , a∗N ) constitute the CE that results in the utility (u∗1, . . . , u∗N ). 
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Theorem 3 establishes the existence of CE, i.e. for a particular a∗ ∈ A, how to choose the parameters
{s¯n, a¯n, λn}
N
n=1 such that a∗ is a CE. However, it neither tells us how these CE can be achieved and
sustained in the dynamic setting nor clarifies how different belief configurations can lead to various CE.
We consider the dynamic scenarios in which users revise their reference points based on their past
local observations over time. Let stn, atn, s˜tn, s¯tn, a¯tn be user n’s state, action, belief function, and reference
points at stage t, in which stn = µ −
∑N
m=1 τma
t
m. We propose a simple rule for individual users to
update their reference points. At stage t, user n sets its s¯tn and a¯tn to be st−1n and at−1n . In other words,
user n’s conjectured utility function at stage t is
utn(s˜
t
n(an), an) = a
βn
n ·
[
µ−
N∑
m=1
τma
t−1
m − λn(an − a
t−1
n )
]
. (32)
Since we have defined the users’ utility function at stage t, upon specifying the rule of how user n updates
its action atn based on its utility function utn(s˜tn(an), an), the trajectory of the entire dynamic process
is determined. The remainder of this paper will investigate the dynamic properties of the best response
and Jacobi update mechanisms and the performance trade-off among the competing users at the resulting
steady-state CE. In particular, for fixed {λn}Nn=1, Section IV-C derives necessary and sufficient conditions
for the convergence of the best response and the Jacobi update dynamics. Section IV-D quantitatively
describes the limiting CE for given {λn}Nn=1 and investigates how the parameters {λn}Nn=1 should be
properly chosen such that Pareto efficiency can be achieved.
C. Dynamic Algorithms
1) Best Response: In the best response algorithm, each user updates its action using the best response
that maximizes its conjectured utility function in (32). Therefore, at stage t, user n chooses its action
according to
atn = Bn(a
t−1) :=
βn(µ−
∑
m∈N\{n} τma
t−1
m )
λn(1 + βn)
+
βn(λn − τn)a
t−1
n
λn(1 + βn)
. (33)
We are interested in characterizing the convergence of the update mechanism defined by (33) when using
various λn to initialize the belief function s˜n.
To analyze the convergence of the best response dynamics, we consider the Jacobian matrix of the
self-mapping function in (33). Let Jik denote the element at row i and column k of the Jacobian matrix
J. The elements of the Jacobian matrix JBR of (33) are defined as:
JBRik =
∂ati
∂at−1k
=


βk(λk−τk)
λk(1+βk)
, if i = k,
− βiτkλi(1+βi) , if i 6= k.
(34)
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For Type II games, the following theorem gives a necessary and sufficient condition under which the
best response dynamics defined in (33) converges.
Theorem 4: For Type II games, a necessary and sufficient condition for the best response dynamics
to converge is
N∑
n=1
τnβn
λn(1 + 2βn)
< 1. (35)
Proof : The best response dynamics converges if and only if the eigenvalues {ξBRn }Nn=1 of the Jacobian
matrix JBR in (34) are all inside the unit circle of the complex plane [25], i.e. |ξBRn | < 1,∀n ∈ N . To
determine the eigenvalues of JBR, we have
det(ξI − JBR) =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
ξ − β1(λ1−τ1)λ1(1+β1)
β1τ2
λ1(1+β1)
. . . β1τNλ1(1+β1)
β2τ1
λ2(1+β2)
ξ − β2(λ2−τ2)λ2(1+β2) . . .
β2τN
λ2(1+β2)
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
βNτ1
λN (1+βN )
βNτ2
λN (1+βN )
. . . ξ − βN (λN−τN )λN (1+βN )
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
ξ − β1(λ1−τ1)λ1(1+β1)
τ2
τ1
( β1
1+β1
− ξ
)
. . . τNτ1
( β1
1+β1
− ξ
)
β2τ1
λ2(1+β2)
ξ − β21+β2 . . . 0
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
βNτ1
λN (1+βN )
0 . . . ξ − βN1+βN
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
(
ξ − β11+β1
)
·
[
1−
∑N
n=1
τn
λn(1−
1+βn
βn
ξ)
]
0 . . . 0
β2τ1
λ2(1+β2)
ξ − β21+β2 . . . 0
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
βNτ1
λN (1+βN )
0 . . . ξ − βN1+βN
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
.
Therefore, we can see that, the eigenvalues of JBR are the roots of
[ N∑
n=1
τn
λn(1−
1+βn
βn
ξ)
− 1
]
·
N∏
n=1
(
ξ −
βn
1 + βn
)
= 0. (36)
Denote q(ξ) =
∑N
n=1
τn
λn(1−
1+βn
βn
ξ)
. First, we assume that βi 6= βj ,∀i, j. Without loss of generality, con-
sider β1 < β2 < · · · < βN . In this case, the eigenvalues of JBR are the roots of q(ξ) = 1. Note that q(ξ)
is a continuous function and it strictly increases in (−∞, β11+β1 ), (
β1
1+β1
, β21+β2 ), · · · , (
βN−1
1+βN−1
, βN1+βN ), and
( βN1+βN ,+∞). We also have limξ→( βn1+βn )− q(ξ) = +∞, limξ→(
βn
1+βn
)+ q(ξ) = −∞, n = 1, 2, · · · , N , and
limξ→−∞ q(ξ) = limξ→+∞ q(ξ) = 0. Therefore, the roots of q(ξ) = 1 lie in (−∞, β11+β1 ), (
β1
1+β1
, β21+β2 ),
· · · , ( βN−11+βN−1 ,
βN
1+βN
). Since q(ξ) strictly increases in (−∞, β11+β1 ), we have |ξ
BR
n | < 1,∀n ∈ N if and
only if q(−1) =
∑N
n=1
τnβn
λn(1+2βn)
< 1.
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Second, we consider the cases in which there exists βi = βj for certain i, j. Suppose that {βn}Nn=1 take
K discrete values κ1, · · · , κK and the number of {βn}Nn=1 that equal to κk is nk. In this case, Equation
(36) is reduced to [ N∑
n=1
τn
λn(1−
1+βn
βn
ξ)
− 1
]
·
K∏
k=1
(
ξ −
κk
1 + κk
)nk = 0. (37)
Hence, equation q(ξ) = 1 has N +K −
∑K
k=1 nk roots in total, and ξ = κk1+κk is a root of multiplicity
nk − 1 for Equation (37), ∀k. All these roots are the eigenvalues of matrix JBR. Similarly, the roots of
q(ξ) = 1 lie in (−∞, κ11+κ1 ), (
κ1
1+κ1
, κ21+κ2 ), · · · , (
κK−1
1+κK−1
, κK1+κK ). A necessary and sufficient condition
under which |ξBRn | < 1,∀n ∈ N is still q(−1) < 1, i.e.
∑N
n=1
τnβn
λn(1+2βn)
< 1. 
Remark 2: Theorem 4 indicates that, if the condition in (35) is satisfied, the best response dynamics
converges linearly to the CE. The convergence rate is mainly determined by maxn∈N |ξBRn |. Suppose
β1 < β2 < · · · < βN and ξBR1 < ξBR2 < · · · < ξBRN . From the proof of Theorem 4, we can see
that, under condition (35), −1 < ξBR1 < β11+β1 < ξBR2 < · · · < ξBRN , and
βN−1
1+βN−1
< ξBRN <
βN
1+βN
.
Therefore, the rate of convergence can be approximated by max{|ξBR1 |, |ξBRN |}. Note that choosing
larger {λn}Nn=1 increases ξBR1 . Hence, if −1 < ξBR1 < −|ξBRN |, increasing {λn}Nn=1, i.e. having more
self-constraint users, accelerate the convergence rate of the best response mechanism. On the other hand,
since ξBRN >
βN−1
1+βN−1
, the convergence rate is lower bounded by βN−11+βN−1 . Therefore, if more than two
users associate large weighting factors β with their individual actions in the utility functions, we have
βN−1
1+βN−1
→ 1 and the best response dynamics converges slowly.
Remark 3: Theorem 4 generalizes the necessary and sufficient condition derived in [22], where users
are assumed to be symmetric, i.e. τn = 1,∀n and they adopt the Nash strategy by choosing λn = τn,∀n.
Due to lack of symmetry, the derivation in [22] is not readily applicable to analyze the convergence of
the best response dynamics. The proof of Theorem 4 instead directly characterizes the eigenvalues of
the Jacobian matrix, and hence, provides a more general convergence analysis of the dynamic algorithms
that allow users to update their actions based on their independent linear conjectures.
Remark 4: In Type II games, a locally stable CE is also globally convergent, which is purely due to
the property of its utility functions specified in (18). From (34), we can see that all the elements in JBR
are independent of the joint play at−1. This is in contrast with Type I games considered in [15], where
local stability of a CE may not imply its global convergence and the best response dynamics may only
converge if the operating point is close enough to the steady-state equilibrium.
2) Jacobi Update: We consider another alternative strategy update mechanism called Jacobi update
[23]. In Jacobi update, every user adjusts its action gradually towards the best response strategy. At stage
15
t, user n chooses its action according to
atn = Jn(a
t−1) := at−1n + ǫ
[
Bn(a
t−1)− at−1n
]
, (38)
in which the stepsize ǫ > 0 and Bn(at−1) is defined in (33). The following theorem establishes the
convergence property of the Jacobi update dynamics.
Theorem 5: In Type II games, for given {τn, βn, λn}Nn=1, the Jacobi update dynamics converges if the
stepsize ǫ is sufficiently small.
Proof : The Jacobian matrix JJU of the self-mapping function (38) satisfies JJU = (1 − ǫ)I + ǫJBR.
Therefore, its eigenvalues {ξJUn }Nn=1 are given by ξJUn = 1 − ǫ+ ǫξBRn . From the proof of Theorem 4,
we know that ξBRn < 1,∀n ∈ N . Therefore, if ǫ < 21−minn ξBRn , we have ξ
JU
n ∈ (−1, 1),∀n ∈ N and the
Jacobi update dynamics converges. 
Remark 5: Theorem 5 indicates that, for any {τn, βn, λn}Nn=1 > 0, the Jacobi update mechanism
globally converges to a CE as long as the stepsize is set to be a small enough positive number. In other
words, the small stepsize in the Jacobi update can compensate for the instability of the best response
dynamics even though the necessary and sufficient condition in (35) is not satisfied.
D. Stability of the Pareto Boundary
In order to understand how to properly choose the parameters {λn}Nn=1 such that it leads to efficient
outcomes, we need to explicitly describe the steady-state CE in terms of the parameters {λn}Nn=1 of the
belief functions. Denote the joint action profile at CE as (a∗1, . . . , a∗N ). From Equation (33), we know
that
(λn + βnτn)a
∗
n +
∑
m∈N\{n}
βnτma
∗
m = βnµ,∀n ∈ N . (39)
The solutions of the above linear equations are
aCEn =
βnµ
λn(1 +
∑N
m=1
τmβm
λm
)
,∀n ∈ N . (40)
Based on the closed-form expression of the CE, the following theorem indicates the stability of the Pareto
boundary in Type II games.
Theorem 6: For Type II games, all the operating points on the Pareto boundary are globally convergent
CE under the best response dynamics.
Proof : Comparing Equations (23) and (40), we can see that, (aCE1 , . . . , aCEN ) = (aPB1 , . . . , aPBN ) if
and only if λn = τn/ωn. Substitute it into the LHS of (35):
N∑
n=1
τnβn
λn(1 + 2βn)
=
N∑
n=1
ωnβn
1 + 2βn
<
∑N
n=1 ωn
2
=
1
2
. (41)
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Condition (35) is satisfied for all the Pareto-optimal operating points. In fact, we have minn ξBRn = 0,
which is because q(0) =
∑N
n=1
τn
λn
=
∑N
n=1 ωn = 1. Therefore, under the best response dynamics, the
Pareto boundary is globally convergent. 
In addition, we also note that Theorem 5 already indicates the stability of the Pareto boundary under
Jacobi update as long as the parameters {τn, βn, λn}Nn=1 are properly chosen.
Remark 6: Since
∑N
n=1 ωn = 1, we can see from the previous proof that, the belief configurations
{λn}
N
n=1 lead to Pareto-optimal operating points if and only if
N∑
n=1
τn
λn
= 1. (42)
Therefore, we can see that, to achieve Pareto-optimality in these non-cooperative scenarios, users need
to choose the belief parameters {λn}Nn=1 to be greater than or equal to the parameters {τn}Nn=1 in the
utility function {un}Nn=1 and the summation of τnλn should be equal to 1. Define user n’s conservativeness
as τnλn , which reflects the ratio between the immediate performance degradation −τn∆an in the actual
utility function and the long-term effect −λn∆an in the conjectured utility function if user n increases
its action by ∆an. The condition in Equation (42) indicates that, to achieve efficient outcomes, the
non-collaborative users need to jointly maintain moderate conservativeness by considering the multi-
user coupling and appropriately choosing {λn}Nn=1. By “moderate”, we mean that users are neither too
aggressive, i.e. λn → τn and
∑N
n=1
τn
λn
→ N , nor too conservative, i.e. λn → +∞ and
∑N
n=1
τn
λn
→ 0.
If more than one user plays the Nash strategy and choose λn = τn, Equation (42) does not hold and the
resulting operating point is not Pareto-optimal. Therefore, myopic selfish behavior is detrimental.
Similarly as in (24), we have
N∑
n=1
ωn log
un(a
CE)
un(aPB)
=
N∑
n=1
ωnβn log
τn(1 +
∑N
j=1 ωjβj)
λnωn(1 +
∑N
j=1
τjβj
λj
)
+ log
1 +
∑N
j=1 ωjβj
1 +
∑N
j=1
τjβj
λj
. (43)
Using Jensen’s inequality, we can conclude
∑N
n=1 ωn log
un(aCE)
un(aPB)
≤ 0 and
∑N
n=1 ωn log
un(aCE)
un(aPB)
= 0
if and only if ωn = τnλn ,∀n. Therefore, if a CE is Pareto efficient, user n’s conservativeness τn/λn
corresponds to the weight assigned to user n in the weighted proportional fairness defined in (10).
As an illustrative example, we simulate a three-user system with parameters β = [1.5 1 0.5], τ =
[3 4 5], µ = 10, ωn =
1
3 ,∀n. In this case, the joint actions and the corresponding utilities at NE and Pareto
boundary are summarized in Table I. The price of anarchy quantified according to (27) is −0.2877 and
the lower bound in (27) is −0.5754. As discussed in Section III.C, both the upper bound and lower
bound in (27) are not tight. Fig. 1 shows the trajectory of the action updates under both best response
and Jacobi update dynamics, in which a0n = 0.5, λn = τnωn ,∀n, and ǫ = 0.5. The best response update
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converges to the Pareto-optimal operating point in around 8 iterations and the Jacobi update experiences
a smoother trajectory and the same equilibrium is attained after more iterations.
E. Discussions
1) Comparison between Type I and Type II games: As mentioned before, the properties of Type I
games have been investigated in the context of wireless random access [15]. Table II summarizes some
similarities and differences between both types of games. First, the two algorithms exhibit different
properties under the best response dynamics. In Type I games, the stable CE may not be globally
convergent. However, the local stability of a CE implies its global convergence in Type II games. Second,
it is shown in [15] that any operating point that is arbitrarily close to the Pareto boundary of the utility
region of Type I games is a stable CE. Similarly, the entire Pareto boundary of Type II games is also stable.
At last, different relationships between the parameter selection and the achieved utility at equilibrium
have been observed for the two types of games. In particular, in Type I games, user n’s utility un is
approximately proportional to the inverse of the parameter λn in its belief function. In contrast, in Type
II games, if the CE is Pareto-optimal, the ratio τn/λn coincide with the weight ωn assigned to user n
in the proportional fairness objective function. In other words, based on the definition of proportional
fairness [26], we know
N∑
n=1
τn(u
′
n − u
∗
n)
λnu∗n
≤ 0, (44)
in which (u′1, u′2, . . . , u′N ) is the users’ achieved utility associated with any other feasible joint action and
(u∗1, u
∗
2, . . . , u
∗
N ) is the optimal achieved utility for problem (10) with ωn = τn/λn and
∑N
n=1 ωn = 1.
2) Pricing Mechanism vs. Conjectural Equilibrium: In order to achieve Pareto-optimality, information
exchanges among users is generally required in order to collaboratively maximize the system efficiency.
The existing cooperative communication scenarios either assume that the information about all the users
is gathered by a trusted moderator (e.g. access point, base station, selected network leader etc.), to which
it is given the authority to centrally divide the available resources among the participating users, or, in
the distributed setting, users exchange price signals (e.g. the Lagrange multipliers for the dual problem)
that reflect the “cost” for consuming per unit constrained resources to maximize the social welfare and
reach Pareto-optimal allocations. As an important tool, the pricing mechanism has been applied in the
distributed optimization of various communication networks [12]. However, we would like to point out
that, the pricing mechanism generally requires repeated coordination information exchange among users
in order to determine the optimal actions and achieve the Pareto-optimality. In contrast, for the linear
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coupled communication games, since the specific structure of the utility function is explored, the CE
approach is able to calculate the Pareto efficient operating point in a distributed manner, without any real-
time information exchange among users. In fact, the underlying coordination is implicitly implemented
when the participating users initialize their belief parameters. Once the belief parameters are properly
initialized by the protocol according to (42), using the proposed dynamic update algorithms, individual
users are able to achieve the Pareto-optimal CE solely based on their individual local observations on
their states and no message exchange is needed during the convergence process. Therefore, the conjecture
equilibrium approach is an important alternative to the pricing-based approach in the linearly coupled
games.
V. CONCLUSION
We derive the structure of the utility functions in the multi-user communication scenarios where a user’s
action has proportionally the same impact over other users’ utilities. The performance gap between NE
and Pareto boundary of the utility region is explicitly characterized. To improve the performance in
non-cooperative cases, we investigate a CE approach which endows users with simple linear beliefs
which enables them to select an equilibrium outcome that is efficient without the need of explicit
message exchanges. The properties of the CE under both the best response and Jacobi dynamic update
mechanisms are characterized. We show that the entire Pareto boundary in linearly coupled games is
globally convergent CE which can be achieved by both studied dynamic algorithms without the need
of real-time message passing. A potential future direction is to see how to extend the CE approach to
the general linearly coupled games that are compositions of the basic two types and certain particular
non-linearly coupled multi-user communication scenarios.
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Fig. 1. The trajectory of the best response and Jacobi update dynamics.
TABLE I
ACTIONS AND PAYOFFS AT NE AND PARETO BOUNDARY.
User 1 User 2 User 3
aNEi 1.25 0.625 0.25
uNEi 3.4939 1.5625 1.25
aPBi 0.833 0.417 0.167
uPBi 3.8036 2.0833 2.0412
TABLE II
COMPARISON BETWEEN TYPE I AND TYPE II GAMES.
Games Best response dynamics Stability vs. efficiency Fairness vs. parameter selection
Type I local stability ⇐ global convergence stable at near-Pareto-optimal points un ∝ τn/λn
Type II local stability ⇔ global convergence stable at the Pareto boundary ωn = τn/λn at the Pareto boundary
